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Afterword
Kenneth Weisbrode and Kiran Klaus Patel
In the time since our 2010workshop, the European Union has generated a
good deal of drama. A serious debt crisis in Greece was repeated in Ireland,
Spain, Italy, and Portugal. It threatened to undermine the basic fabric of
not only the Eurozone but also of the entire European project, according to
some pessimists. Commitment to the implementation of drastic, but much-
needed fiscal reforms stood against the idea of European solidarity and a
radical, Europe-wide growth plan. Themany reform steps that themember
states agreed on brought partial remedy but most were concluded under
considerable time pressure, in which global markets instead of parliamen-
tary procedures dictated the speed and direction. What they did bring was
greater power of oversight for Brussels, yet at the time of this writing, it is
still unclear how and if the sovereign debt crisis will be resolved on a more
permanent basis.
Much of the commentary about the crisis, which in fact came to seem
less like a crisis than a saga over the course of 2011 and 2012, placed the
blame for it on two sources, primarily: the after effect of the 2008 global
financial collapse and the structural flaws of the Maastricht Treaty. The
latter case relates directly to the various themes and problems raised in the
preceding chapters. To recapitulate the standard, although oversimplified
and perhaps overdrawn calculus of German reunification: it was meant to
take place within a stronger European institutional structure, which
the Treaty of Maastricht and the various NATO-related promises –
described in detail in Frédéric Bozo’s chapter – were supposed to bring
about. Specifically, it also meant the adoption of a new currency – the
Euro – that, largely on French insistence, Germany had to support and,
largely on Jacques Delors’s insistence, Europe had to embrace as the means
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to counter Margaret Thatcher’s push for a liberalized internal market.
Both went against the instincts of many people, particularly in West
Germany where a strong Deutschmark and various forms of protection
were sacrosanct, but Helmut Kohl agreed to the compromise. Economic
results remained mixed; although in its first years, the Euro and the
European Central Bank’s monetary policy had restrictive effects on the
German economy, it benefited later on. However, as has been pointed out
many times during the recent crisis, a monetary union without a fiscal
union cannot survive for very long. When growth stops, its fabric tears
apart. Thus, Germany and other richer beneficiaries of the Euro have
found themselves in a vise: stick to the principles – namely fiscal discipline –
that have worked so well for them and watch the Euro collapse because of
the failures of other states to abide by them; or “abandon” the principles in
order to save the Euro but to enter unknown territory with one’s own
economy. That such a dilemma was not only predictable but predicted at
the time ofMaastricht has perhapsmade it evenmore troublesome because
the members of the European Union were later forced to confront and
question the basis of their mutual project well after the debates were
thought to have been settled.
Some people have said that this reveals the cynicism of the pro-EU camp
that knew the unbalanced and unsustainable nature of the Maastricht
Treaty, and calculated that, in the medium-term, it would lead to ever
more centralization in Brussels no matter what. Risking the Union thus
appears as the strategy to achieve an ever-deeper Union. Others would
stress, however, that the Treaty was the optimal outcome of a tough, inter-
governmental bargaining process, or that it simply reflects the minimal
compromise that the elected leaders of the member states could agree on.
The viability of the European project, going back to its earliest days, has
always been debated, doubted, reaffirmed, and debated again, repeatedly.
SinceMaastricht there have been threemore treaties, a constitution, a fiscal
compact, and more than a dozen referendums, nearly half of which were
lost by the pro-Union side. The two central “flaws” of the project – the
imbalances among states and the “democratic deficit” – are the same ones
that have plagued European integration from the start, so much so that its
history could appear less cyclical than a single themewith variations. It will
probably continue this way for some time to come, or at least as long as it
survives, which it appears to be doing.
An important, related theme in all this is the role of the United States.
Barack Obama’s administration’s position during the crisis in 2011 and
2012 has been consistent: this is a European problem and Europeans can
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solve it. This did not mean that the United States stood aloof –Obama and
several members of his administration appeared more worried as the crisis
deepened, and hinted that a great deal of talking was being done in
private – but the customary rhetoric of transatlantic solidarity and com-
munity was missing. The reason that was given was that European leaders
neither needed nor wanted U.S. advice. The precedent that was often
mentioned was the 1998 Asian financial crisis, the response to which
U.S. officials and bankers more or less micromanaged. Such an approach
was not possible a decade and a half later, least of all with Europe.
This change points to a larger conclusion about the period covered
in this book. What if the “shift” described by Mark Gilbert had not
occurred when it did? Or, what if the Berlin Wall had fallen after
Maastricht – assuming for the moment that the relationship between
the two was merely correlative rather than causal – instead of before?
These counterfactuals restate the double-sided question with which we
began this volume: How much did the relative neglect of intra-European
affairs by the United States during the 1980s work in their favor? How
much did the promoters of European integration derive strength from an
official (and, to a lesser extent, unofficial) counter-emphasis in the United
States or (among opponents) in Europe?More than two decades hence, is
it possible to conclude, moreover, that one of the main effects of global-
ization has been the erosion of transatlantic relations and a strengthening
of European unity when some structural and political logic suggests that
the opposite should have occurred? Did it have to happen thus? Or is it
still too early to tell?
Answering these questions reminds us that the periodization of contem-
porary history is always in flux. Several of the foregoing chapters demon-
strate that the “1980s” really began in the late 1970s, most likely sometime
around 1977–78. The Cold War, transatlantic and European narratives
support that chronology. So, when did they end? That is to say, when did
the current divergence really set in? We argue that it occurred precisely
around the time of Maastricht, which was depicted on both sides of the
Atlantic, as Mark Gilbert has shown, as a project of, by, and for
Europeans. It had been the preference of some Americans, in fact, for this
to continue, with the new EU taking the lead in enlargement to the East for
the integration of the former Warsaw Pact nations into the new “Europe,
whole and free.” For a variety of reasons this was not possible, at least not
right away, and so the emphasis of the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton
administrations shifted again back to NATO. Why NATO? The rationale
of the former Warsaw Pact nations was obvious enough: they wanted a
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post-Soviet insurance policy that had little or nothing to do with deeper
integration with the EU per se. The rationale for NATO, and for the United
States in particular, was less obvious. To many people at the time, it
appeared to be a decision taken by default.
Integrationism prevailed nonetheless. It was said that NATO
enlargement had to happen in order to reunite Europe on an institu-
tional basis; that it preceded or outpaced EU enlargement did not mean
it would supplant it, at least not in principle, and the United States was
only too happy to oblige, having come to see NATO enlargement as a
way – perhaps the only way – to keep the Alliance viable after the Cold
War. It seemed odd to some people at the time, but in retrospect it
makes sense that the 1990s saw another peak of Atlanticist sentiment
in the United States (not to mention in East-Central Europe) and to a
lesser extent in Western Europe. That this took place alongside the
tragic wars of Yugoslav succession in which NATO intervened after the
diplomatic failure of both European and UN intermediaries was taken
as further evidence that the transatlantic, security relationship still
mattered. Yet, how much it was connected, or disconnected, to other
relationships, both across the Atlantic and within Europe, remains
imprecise.
During the following decade, relations between Europe and the United
States reached a new low as a result of the Iraq war. If the apogee of the
1980s was not over by the mid-1990s, it surely was by the following
decade. Transatlantic relations had gone from apogee to nadir. Still, it is
unclear if the George W. Bush years were just another crisis in the long
sequence of transatlantic relations since the early Cold War or a more
fundamental turning point. Political conflict by itself does not say much
about the viability of a political order. Bush’s second term brought the
two sides closer together again. And despite these conflicts, NATO and
then EU enlargement proceeded apace, and some measure of transatlan-
tic cooperation was restored. We are right to ask how much of that was
anticipated and set into motion during the 1980s as a post-Cold War
project, and whether, in retrospect, that decade, or parts of the decade as
several of the previous chapters have suggested, do not represent so much
an apogee as a culmination or, alternatively, a catharsis and the begin-
ning of a new departure for the two parallel, late twentieth-century
narratives. As Frédéric Bozo’s chapter has illustrated, the counterpoint
of rushing to a policy failure is a pre-emptive concession that ultimately
leads to success when the timing and other factors become more
favorable.
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We began this volume with a discussion of periodization, which also
raises questions of causation. Now, on reflection, we can say that the
1980s both comprise and represent several, not necessarily mutually
exclusive, chronologies of the end of the Cold War and the integration of
Europe. We cannot conclude with certainty that one set of actions defi-
nitely caused the other, or that the two were so interrelated as to be fully
interdependent. Nevertheless, they are difficult, probably impossible, to
disentangle. And here we speak mainly of politics and economics. Space
did not permit us to include potentially valuable subjects – the ebb and flow
of transatlantic tourism, or the Erasmus and similar exchange programs
within Europe, for example, or the trends in fashion, art, popular music,
and film. It would also be useful to examine the full set of questions from an
outsider’s perspective. The chapters by Ksenia Demidova, Arthe Van Laer,
Holger Nehring, and Giles Scott-Smith do this to an extent in their respec-
tive areas, but it would also be important to know what others from parts
of the world undergoing transformation in the late twentieth century –
Asians or Africans, for example, or a wider range of actors from East-
Central Europe – perceived the intersection of transatlantic and European
relations during this period. To a large extent, then, our story has been an
inwardly focused one. This is not meant to signify that Europeans and
Americans were the only actors who mattered in it, or that politicians and
other officials, particularly those from multilateral institutions, were the
exclusive arbiters of events.
This is another way of saying that the transatlantic history of the 1980s
has only just begun to receive serious treatment. May others continue what
we have started.
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